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Abstract  
 
Many online businesses, including most of the largest platforms, seek and provide attention. These 
online attention rivals provide products and features to obtain the attention of consumers and sell 
some of that attention, through other products and services, to merchants, developers and others 
who value it. The multi-sided business of seeking and providing attention is fluid with rivalries 
crossing boundaries defined by the features of the products and services. It is also dynamic. Rivals 
introduce new products and services, some involving drastic innovation, frequently. Online attention 
rivals impose competitive constraints on each other.  Product differentiation tempers the 
significance of these constraints in particular situations. But the relevant differentiation mainly 
involves aspects of the attention that is procured and sold rather than, necessarily, particular features 
of the products and services used for acquiring and delivering that attention. Antitrust analysis 
should consider these competitive constraints in evaluating market definition, market power, and the 
potential for anticompetitive effects. Most importantly, antitrust analysis should focus on 
competition for seeking and providing attention rather than the particular products and services 
used for securing and delivering this attention. The existence of competition among attention rivals 
does not imply that antitrust should reduce the vigor with which it examines mergers and 
exclusionary practices among these platforms.  It just needs to look for problems in the right places. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
  
Many online businesses attract consumers to their sites by offering them products and 
services, often for free.1 The products and services are varied. They include search, social 
networking, e-commerce, news, videos, mobile games, and messaging. Novel ones appear regularly. 
Some of those attract significant traffic quickly. Existing ones frequently add new features to keep 
their viewers coming back and to attract new ones. Many of these businesses then sell merchants, 
developers, and others businesses access to some of the attention they have harvested.  They make 
most, and sometimes all, of their revenue from supplying attention.2 These “attention rivals” 
compete with each other for the limited time of consumers and for providing that limited time to 
merchants, developers, and others that want access to it.3  
This Article argues that that “attention”—its acquisition and its delivery—is the relevant 
dimension for analyzing the competitive constraints these rivals impose on each other.4 In practice, 
attention rivals frequently face more significant competition from purveyors of new products or 
services, that could divert consumer attention from them, than from the entry of close substitutes 
for their existing products or services. Ostensibly different attention rivals often substitute for each 
other from the standpoint of consumers and merchants. Product differentiation tempers the 
significance of these constraints. The differentiation that is relevant, however, mainly involves 
aspects of the attention that is procured and sold rather than particular features of the products and 
services used for acquiring and delivering that attention. 
Antitrust analysis should therefore focus on competition for securing and delivering 
attention in considering market definition, market power, and competitive effects. Focusing on 
competition between specific products and services, rather than attention, could result in 
competition authorities and courts making either false-negative or false-positive errors in their 
 
1 Online businesses for the purpose of this Article include websites as well as web-based and native applications for 
mobile devices. 
2 These online attention seekers may compete with offline attention seekers for attention and also for providing that 
attention to merchants and others who want access to it. This competition is increasingly important as the boundaries 
between on-line and off-line attention seeking blur as they do, for example, in the increasing competition between online 
versus cable and over-the-air distribution of television shows and movies.  This Article focuses on examining 
competition among online attention seekers. It briefly discusses the implications for the broader analysis of competition 
among online and offline attention seekers but leaves the important topic of online and offline competition for future 
consideration.  
3 Attention rivals are multi-sided platforms; they are intermediaries between suppliers and demanders of attention.  For a 
survey of multi-sided platforms including advertising-supported ones see David S. Evans and Richard Schmalensee 
(2012), “The Antitrust Analysis of Multi-Sided Platforms”, in Roger Blair and Daniel Sokol (eds.), Oxford Handbook on 
International Antitrust Economics, forthcoming.  Available  
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2185373.   
4 For the purposes of this Article, attention is the time that consumers spend focusing their minds on content.  Attention 
rivals provide products and services to buyers, such as advertisers, who would like to get some of this attention.  This 
attention is not necessarily fungible.  Depending on the circumstances in which it is provided advertisers might have a 
chance of getting more attention or greater focused from consumers or might get attention in a context that makes that 
attention more valuable because they have a greater chance of persuading consumers to buy something.  
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decisions. False-negative errors could result from concluding that attention rivals do not compete 
because they offer dissimilar products or services. False positive errors could follow from ignoring 
competition among attention rivals that offer different products and services.  Analyzing attention, 
which is the dimension on which these rivals compete in fact, reduces the likelihood of these errors.  
The precise contours of markets, market power, and impacts on competition will depend on the 
particular circumstances of the subjects of the antitrust analysis, the conduct under consideration, 
and the extent of differentiation among relevant attention rivals. 
Some authors have argued that antitrust analysis should consider dynamic competition and, 
in particular, that firms are competing “for the market” rather than “in the market.”5   This Article 
shows, by contrast, that competition in the market appears much more important for attention 
seekers once the analysis is shifted from competition over providing particular products or services 
to competition for acquiring and delivering attention. When it comes to attention seeking, there are 
few winners that “take all” in practice. Likewise, there is little evidence that online markets tend to 
converge to monopoly because of network effects6 once the analysis focuses on attention as the 
proper dimension for evaluating competition. Nevertheless, it turns out that competition for 
attention is highly dynamic with rivals introducing new products and services, some involving drastic 
innovation, frequently.  There are high rates of churn—that is entry and exit—among attention 
rivals.  Therefore, many of the points made in by authors concerning antitrust analysis in 
dynamically competitive industries apply to attention rivals. 
This Article’s most novel contribution comes in showing that many online businesses 
compete for a limited amount of attention from consumers and that features or products and 
services are basically tools, in competition with each other, for acquiring this attention. The next two 
sections develop these propositions in detail. Section II documents that a number of firms compete 
with each other online for the attention of consumers and face constant threats of entry by other 
firms that compete for that attention.  Attention competition is the major competitive dynamic for a 
significant part of the digital economy. Section III then presents the core argument that there is a 
strong presumption that attention seekers compete for procuring attention regardless of the 
products and services they offer for doing this. Focusing on the narrow category of online 
advertising-supported attention seekers, this section argues that, as a first approximation, attention 
seekers are price takers in terms of what they pay to secure attention. It then examines the 
circumstances under which differentiation could limit this competition and thereby lead to segments 
in which online advertising-supported attention seekers could have significant market power. 
 
5 David S. Evans and Richard Schmalensee (2002), “Some Economic Aspects of Antitrust Analysis in Dynamically 
Competitive Industries,” in Adam B. Jaffe, Josh Lerner, and Scott Stern (eds.), Innovation Policy and the Economy, 
Volume 2, Cambridge: MIT Press, 1-50; Douglas H. Ginsburg and Joshua D. Wright (2012), “Dynamic Analysis and the 
Limits of Antitrust Institutions,” Antitrust Law Journal, 78(1), 1-22; Gregory Sidak and David Teece (2009), “Dynamic 
Competition in Antitrust Law,” Journal of Competition Law and Economics, 5(4), 581-631. 
6 Likewise, there is little evidence that online markets tend to converge to monopoly because of network effects once the 
analysis focuses on attention as the proper dimension for evaluating competition. For a survey of some of the arguments 
concerning “tipping to monopoly” in online network industries see Carl Shapiro and Hal Varian (1998), Information 
Rules: A Strategic Guide to the Network Economy. 
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The other novel contribution of this Article is to document that advertisers consider that the 
different sources of attention are substitutes.7 This, of course, concerns the other side of these 
platforms. Section IV considers competition among attention rivals for delivering attention, focusing 
on the particular case of supplying attention to advertisers.  It shows that most online advertisers use 
channel-attribution technologies that enable them to substitute different types of online advertising, 
in some case automatically through computerized decision rules, for each other based on rules for 
maximizing rates of return on investment in advertising spending.  
As with any industry, differentiation can soften the degree of competition among rivals.  
Section V shows that the relevant sources of differentiation ultimately involve the returns advertisers 
can get from the attention.  That could involve differences in the type of viewers that are acquired, 
their propensity to purchase, and aspects of how advertising is delivered to them.  It does not 
necessarily involve—although it could—the particular products or services used to secure or deliver 
attention. Differentiation among platform rivals could result in significant market power at the 
platform level that could be sustained if strong differentiation was accompanied by substantial 
barriers to entry.  This section also examines the implications of the analysis for online versus offline 
competition for attention.  Whether businesses are online or offline they are competing for a 
relatively inelastic supply of attention from consumers and they are imposing competitive 
constraints on each other.  Advertisers are also substituting online and offline advertising based on 
rate-of-return on investment decisions and in some cases are using channel attribution technologies 
to analyze opportunities for substitution. Of course, as with online attention rivals, product 
differentiation considerations could temper the degree of substitution between online and offline 
rivals for attention.   
Section VI argues that by reflecting the business realities of how competition takes place 
among online attention seekers—the approach recommended by this Article—would tend to reduce 
both false positive and false negative errors in antitrust decisions. It then describes several recent 
merger and monopolization cases that illustrate the points made in this Article. The European 
Commission’s decision to approve Microsoft’s acquisition of Skype, for example, is based on many 
of the same considerations described in Section II involving dynamic competition and the 
substitution among seemingly different products and services. 
Section VII describes how antitrust analysis should investigate competitive constraints 
among platform rivals and presents brief conclusions.  
II. SEEKING ATTENTION 
Pinterest allows members to pin images, videos and other objects to their pinboards and to 
comment on what other members have pinned.  In August 2012, about two years after its launch, it 
was the 47th most trafficked website in the United States.  The 23.5 million visitors that came to 
 
7 This section incorporates key contributions by Catherine Tucker who also pointed the author to the new channel 
attribution technologies discussed here. See Catherine Tucker, “The Implications of Improved Attribution and 
Measurability for Online Advertising Markets,” mimeo, November 6, 2012.   
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Pinterest that month spent about 17.5 million hours on the site looking at others’ pin boards or 
pinning things to their own pin board.8 
People only have so much time. These 23.5 million users must have shifted their attention 
from something else to Pinterest. To participate in this new pinning site they either spent more time 
online or shifted their time from other things they were doing online. They probably did a bit of 
both.  Those 17.5 million hours, though, came from somewhere. 
As a result of Pinterest’s explosive growth, other online attention seekers likely did less well.  
Some of the time that people were spending on them was diverted to pinning. Getting users to 
spend more time on their properties became harder because consumers had another activity they 
could do.  Pinterest faces the same threats to its traffic going forward.  New properties emerge and 
existing ones develop features that will attract users. As attention shifts among properties so do the 
opportunities for selling advertising. 
The rivalry for attention is central to understanding competition among online businesses.  
This Section documents that rivalry on the web and notes how that rivalry has now extended to 
applications on mobile devices. 
A. GROWTH AND CHANGE ON THE WEB 
The overall consumption of web services has grown dramatically as a result of technological 
change that has reduced the cost and increased the quality of consuming web-based services.  The 
fraction of US households with broadband service in the home increased almost seven-fold from 10 
percent in 2001 to 68 percent in 2010 while the speed of service for the typical household increased.9 
Over this same time period the amount of content and services that were available to consumers 
grew dramatically. As a result of better and more widely available technology for accessing web-
based content and the increase in the amount of that content, the number of monthly visits to the 
web by American consumers increased from roughly 16 billion in September 2002 to 34 billion in 
September 2007 (a 113 percent increase over 5 years) to 55 billion in September 2012 (a 62 percent 
increase over 5 years).10 The number of visits increased by 243 percent over the decade. 
 
8 Compete.com, Traffic and Engagement Metrics, August 2012. 
9 National Telecommunications and Information Administration (2001), Households with Internet, available at 
http://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/table_householdinternet2001.pdf, based on Bureau of the Census 
(2001), Current Population Survey, September 2001 Internet and Computer Use Supplement; National 
Telecommunications and Information Administration (2001), Household’s Internet Connection Type, available at 
http://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/table_householdinternetconnection2001.pdf, based on Bureau of the 
Census (2011), Current Population Survey, September 2001 Internet and Computer Use Supplement; National 
Telecommunications and Information Administration (2011), Households Using the Internet In and Outside the Home, 
available at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/data/CPS2010Tables/t11_2.txt, based on Bureau of the Census (2011), 
Current Population Survey, October 2011 School Enrollment and Internet Use Supplement. 
10 Compete.com, Traffic and Engagement Metrics, September 2002, September 2007, and September 2012. 
Compete.com collects real-time clickstream data from users who have installed its toolbar, and combines this with 
clickstream data licensed from ISPs. The combined panel contains over two million U.S. Internet users. Normalization is 
used to make the panel representative of the population of U.S. users of web browsers. For more details, see 
Compete.com, “Overview of Data Methodology and Practices,” available at 
http://media.compete.com/site_media/upl/img/Compete_Data_Methodology_3.pdf. These data—and all of the other 
data on online use reported below—do not include mobile devices. Starting in the late 2000s mobile devices—smart 
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Over the past decade, the websites that receive the most attention—measured by the 
amount of attention spent on them—have changed dramatically.  Table 1 lists the top fifty web 
domains in the US based on time spent on them in September 2002, September 2007, and 
September 2012.11  Of the top fifty domains in September 2002, only 23 (46 percent) were still in the 
top fifty in September 2007, and only 13 (26 percent) were still in the top fifty in September 2012.12  
Within ten years, almost 37 of the top 50 websites in September 2002 had fallen out of the top 50 
and 5 had fallen out of the 15,000 altogether. The correlation between the ranks of the top 15,000 
websites across years is also revealing. The correlation in ranks of websites in September 2002 and 
September 2012, for domains ranked in both periods, was .41. The corresponding correlations were 
.58 for September 2007 and September 2012, and .56 for September 2002 and September 2007. 
These are relatively low levels of correlation between ranks given the short periods of time and 
therefore reflect considerable churning. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
phones and tablets—that could access the Internet were available to consumers. Applications for these devices could 
reside on the web in which case consumers access the application through their mobile phone browser or could reside 
on the mobile device itself and provide both online and offline services.  See Fred Cavazza (2011), “Mobile Web App vs. 
Native App? It’s Complicated,” Forbes.com, September 27, 2011, available at 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/fredcavazza/2011/09/27/mobile-web-app-vs-native-app-its-complicated/. 
11 See, id., for a description of the data used for Table 1. 
12 Not all of these sites are attention rivals that buy and sell attention. Some, such as chase.com and paypal.com, are 
merchant websites that get attention but do not resell it to other businesses.  However, since these merchant websites 
have tended to stay in the top 50 for the entire decade the evidence on exit from the top 50 would be even stronger if 
they had been excluded. 
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Table 1: Top 50 US Websites in September 2002, 2007, and 2012, Ranked by September 2002 Time Spent 
Domain Description Rank 
Sept-2002 
Rank 
Sept-2007 
Rank 
Sept-2012 
Yahoo.com Portal 1 1 3 
Msn.com Portal 2 2 8 
Ebay.com Auctions 3 4 6 
Untd.com ISP 4 1,546 - 
Google.com Search 5 3 4 
Go.com Portal 6 8 13 
Aol.com Portal 7 7 9 
Neopets.com Children/Family 8 26 508 
Pogo.com Games 9 5 14 
Sportsline.com Sports 10 17 - 
Amazon.com Retail 11 11 15 
Lycos.com Search 12 91 1,346 
Blackplanet.com Social Networking 13 40 463 
Microsoft.com Software 14 19 48 
Netscape.com Software 15 276 2,164 
Excite.com Search 16 72 608 
Nfl.com Sports 17 18 33 
Geocities.com Web Hosting 18 163 12,628 
Iwon.com Portal 19 64 641 
Monster.com Jobs 20 33 131 
Nytimes.com News 21 56 77 
Ezboard.com Discussion 22 199 - 
Match.com Dating 23 22 52 
Livejournal.com Blogging 24 89 540 
Cnn.com News 25 13 34 
Asianavenue.com Social Networking 26 11,586 - 
Passport.net Login Credentials 27 359 4,544 
Expedia.com Travel 28 52 126 
Ask.com Search 29 29 44 
Mapquest.com Maps 30 15 54 
Bankofamerica.com Banking 31 12 23 
Weather.com Weather 32 45 55 
Realtor.com Real Estate 33 50 120 
Cartoonnetwork.com Entertainment 34 68 56 
Com.com Product Reviews 35 806 - 
Autotrader.com Autos 36 42 130 
Travelocity.com Travel 37 71 251 
Adultfriendfinder.com Social Networking 38 16 70 
Voyeurweb.com Porn 39 97 1,098 
Paypal.com Payments 40 23 64 
Classmates.com Social Networking 41 67 199 
Altavista.com Search 42 211 5,440 
Msnbc.com News 43 918 867 
About.com Reference 44 47 84 
Literotica.com Porn 45 37 72 
Dell.com Computers 46 59 294 
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Mail.com Web Mail 47 133 331 
Wellsfargo.com Banking 48 5 24 
Orbitz.com Travel 49 113 281 
Matchmaker.com Dating 50 1,463 6,943 
Careerbuilder.com Jobs 57 28 97 
Mlb.com Sports 59 35 79 
Fanfiction.net Hobby/Interest 60 21 47 
Usatoday.com News 65 48 85 
Ancestry.com Hobby/Interest 68 54 38 
Hotmail.com Web Mail 72 20 - 
Imdb.com Movie Reference 90 44 107 
Foxnews.com News 92 46 39 
Craigslist.org Classifieds 103 6 5 
Target.com Retail 158 39 71 
Walmart.com Retail 169 24 27 
Chase.com Banking 196 27 22 
Netflix.com Video 209 31 10 
Worldwinner.com Games 234 36 100 
Verizon.com ISP 242 100 41 
Comcast.net ISP 257 14 11 
Bellsouth.net ISP 286 49 - 
Att.com ISP 305 34 49 
Phoenix.edu Education 396 43 68 
Blogger.com Blogging 500 30 578 
Eharmony.com Dating 536 38 322 
Blogspot.com Blogging 625 - 43 
Univision.com Entertainment 670 41 225 
Runescape.com Browser MMORPG 726 9 350 
Charter.net ISP 1,701 195 18 
Foxsports.com Sports 2,475 32 59 
Wikipedia.org Reference 6,761 10 17 
Xnxx.com Porn 10,212 3,769 29 
Babylon.com Translation Software - 3,746 45 
Cbssports.com Sports - 9,100 50 
Facebook.com Social Networking - - 1 
Youtube.com Video - - 2 
Live.com Portal - - 7 
Bing.com Search - - 12 
Twitter.com Social Networking - - 16 
Xhamster.com Porn - - 19 
Pornhub.com Porn - - 20 
Centurylink.net ISP - - 21 
Pinterest.com Online Pinboard - - 25 
Mycenturylink.com ISP - - 26 
Huffingtonpost.com News - - 28 
Tumblr.com Social Networking - - 30 
Xvideos.com Porn - - 31 
Pandora.com Music - - 32 
Avg.com Antivirus Software - - 35 
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Roblox.com Games - - 36 
Tagged.com Social Networking - - 37 
Nbcnews.com News - - 40 
Redtube.com Porn - - 42 
Youporn.com Porn - - 46 
Source: Compete.com, September 2002, September 2007, and September 2012 
Grey shading indicates exit from the top 50 in either 2007 or 2012. 
 
B. COMPETITION FOR ATTENTION 
   
While these data document massive growth and flux in the web business over the last decade 
they do not demonstrate that these web properties are competing for attention with each other.  It is 
possible that when a new web property appears it gets people to spend additional time on the web 
rather than diverting time away from other properties. It is also possible that these new properties 
attract people who were not using the web before.  However, as the percent of the population that 
uses the web approaches the saturation point, and people reach the upper limits of their available 
leisure time, these web properties compete for an increasingly limited amount of attention. 
The time the average American spends online increased with the expansion of the web over 
much of the 2000s. Figure 1, which is based on the Digital Future Report by the USC Annenberg 
School’s Center for the Digital Future, shows that the average number of hours per week for US 
Internet users increased from 9.4 hours in 2001 to 19.0 hours in 2009. 
Figure 1: Hours Per Week Spent Online, US Residents Age 12+ 
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By the end of the decade the average amount of time spent online leveled off and in fact appears to 
have declined somewhat. The Annenberg Center reports that the time spent online by the average 
U.S. Internet user declined from 19.0 hours per week in 2009 to 18.3 hours per week in 2010.13 
The total amount of time spent on line increased by 373 percent from 1.5 billion hours in 
September 2002 to 7.1 billion hours in September 2012.14  This reflects the increase in the number 
of web users and the increase in the amount each of these users spends online. The number of 
attention seekers has grown faster than total amount of time spent online. Between 2001 and 2010, 
the number of distinct web servers increased by more than 601 percent, from less than 36 million to 
over 255 million.15  Most likely, the amount of content increased even more. The more rapid growth 
of attention seeking compared to the growth of total time spent on line provided implies that 
existing websites lose attention to new ones.  
Table 2 shows changes in total time spent among the top websites over the last decade.16  Of 
the top 15,000 websites in September 2002, 12,775 (85 percent) had fewer hours spent by visitors in 
September 2012 than in September 2002. Furthermore, 14,036 (94 percent) increased the total time 
spent by less than the 373 percent increase in the overall time spent on websites, and therefore had 
declining shares of attention. Even with the total time spent on the web increasing by nearly a factor 
of five over this period, the 85 percent of websites in the top 15,000 in September 2002 which lost 
attention managed to lose a total of 460 million of hours by September 2012. These 460 million 
hours represent 30 percent of the total number of hours spent on all websites in September 2002. 
Notably, these data do not include mobile. Especially over the recent shorter time periods, 
attention is being diverted from websites viewed from personal computers to mobile applications 
including the use of mobile browsers for surfing the web 
 
13 USC Annenberg School’s Center for the Digital Future (2010, 2011), Digital Future Report, available at 
http://www.digitalcenter.org/pages/site_content.asp?intGlobalId=20.  These figures do not include the use of mobile 
applications. The diversion of time from personal computers to mobile could explain a portion of the decline. However, 
it is unlikely that the use of mobile applications accounted for much of the drop during this time period.  According to 
Nielsen data, 23 percent of mobile subscribers had smart phones in the first quarter of 2010. However, of this 23 
percent, only 37 percent had Apple and Android phones which were the only smart phones with significant application 
use.  Therefore only 8.5 percent (37 percent of 23 percent) of mobile phone users had smart phones that could entail 
significant application use. 
14 Based on an analysis of data from compete.com 
15 Netcraft Web Server Survey, available at http://news.netcraft.com/archives/category/web-server-survey/. 
16 Table 3 excludes websites that are not primarily attention-seekers, as well as cases where special circumstance can 
account for the changes in time spent at the site. 
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Table 2: Change in Time Spent at Selected US Websites 
Website Category Sept-2002 to Sept 2012, 
Millions of Hours 
Sept-2002 to Sept-2012, 
Percent change 
Facebook.com Social Networking +872.0 million hours N/A 
Youtube.com Video +416.7 million hours N/A 
Google.com Search +199.3 million hours +1066.9 percent 
Craigslist.org Classifieds +133.3 million hours +15,344.7 percent 
Yahoo.com Portal +109.4 million hours +54.9 percent 
Live.com Portal +106.6 million hours N/A 
Aol.com Portal +67.1 million hours +501.1 percent 
Ebay.com Auction +66.6 million hours +135.9 percent 
Netflix.com Video +59.2 million hours +11,746.3 percent 
Comcast.net ISP Portal +58.2 million hours +14,239.8 percent 
Bing.com Search +55.4 million hours N/A 
Pogo.com Games +41.4 million hours +517.9 percent 
Amazon.com Retail +39.2 million hours +604.9 percent 
Go.com Portal +37.4 million hours +245.2 percent 
Twitter.com Social Networking +33.0 million hours N/A 
Wikipedia.org Reference +27.1 million hours +269,034.5 percent 
Livejournal.com Blogging -2.6 million hours -75.5 percent 
Passport.net Login Credentials -3.1 million hours -97.6 percent 
Asianavenue.com Social Networking -3.2 million hours -100.0 percent 
Ezboard.com Discussion -3.7 million hours -100.0 percent 
Iwon.com Games -3.9 million hours -84.7 percent 
Exite.com Search -4.6 million hours -85.9 percent 
Geocities.com Web Hosting -4.8 million hours -99.8 percent 
Blackplanet.com Social Networking -5.1 million hours -84.1 percent 
Netscape.com Portal -5.2 million hours -96.5 percent 
Lycos.com Search -6.1 million hours -94.9 percent 
Sportsline.com Sports -7.8 million hours -100.0 percent 
Neopets.com Children/Family -11.0 million hours -92.4 percent 
Untd.com ISP Portal -23.5 million hours -100.0 percent 
Msn.com Portal -59.4 million hours -39.6 percent 
 
Source: Compete.com, September 2002, September 2007, and September 2012. The Compete.com data does not include visits from mobile browsers. 
 
The question remains whether these shifts in time allocation are limited to shifts between 
different websites that offer similar services, or whether consumers switch their browsing between 
distinct, broadly defined categories. If consumers switch between categories, it would imply that 
websites offering entirely different services are in direct competition for scarce attention. To answer 
this question, we examined the top 500 websites in the Compete.com data, determined whether they 
could be classified as attention rivals, and assigned each to a category. These 500 websites accounted 
for 60 percent of all time spent on the web in September 2012. For each category, we calculated the 
change in total time, and the change in the share of total time, spent at attention-seekers in that 
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category. Table 3 shows the results for September 2002 to September 2012.17 Table 3 suggests that 
there were large shifts in traffic between different categories. The most striking results in the long-
term are the rise of social networking and video relative relative toand the fall of search and 
portals.18 
Table 3: Change in Time Spent Online in the US at Selected Website Categories, 2002-2012 
Category Share of Time Spent, 2002 Share of Time Spent, 2012 Change 
Social Networking 2.4% 29.4% 27.0% 
Video 0.0% 13.0% 13.0% 
Porn 0.9% 4.4% 3.5% 
Games 1.7% 4.1% 2.4% 
Reference 1.2% 2.1% 0.9% 
Hobby/Interest 1.1% 1.6% 0.5% 
Deals/Rewards 0.1% 0.4% 0.3% 
Music 0.2% 0.5% 0.3% 
Retail 1.4% 1.6% 0.3% 
Free Downloads 0.0% 0.3% 0.2% 
Education 0.2% 0.4% 0.2% 
File Sharing 0.0% 0.1% 0.1% 
Photo 0.3% 0.3% 0.0% 
Health 0.1% 0.2% 0.0% 
Dating 1.2% 1.2% 0.0% 
Local Information 0.2% 0.1% 0.0% 
Blogging 0.6% 0.5% -0.1% 
Web Mail 0.5% 0.3% -0.2% 
Chat and Related Services 0.3% 0.0% -0.3% 
Jobs 1.1% 0.6% -0.6% 
Auction/Classified/Listings 9.4% 8.5% -0.9% 
Travel 1.5% 0.5% -1.0% 
News/Entertainment 2.7% 1.6% -1.1% 
Other 1.4% 0.1% -1.3% 
Virtual World 1.9% 0.5% -1.4% 
Web Hosting 1.5% 0.0% -1.5% 
Search/Portal 68.2% 27.7% -40.4% 
Source: Compete.com, September 2002, September 2007, and September 2012. 
This analysis provides a presumption that attention seekers compete with each other, at least 
to some degree, across even broadly defined products and service categories.  When one attention 
seeker gets more attention some other attention seeker is probably getting less.  As Yahoo! observes, 
“[w]e also compete with social media and networking sites which are attracting a substantial and 
 
17 Over this period some of the changes are the result of people shifting their attention from the use of PCs to mobile 
devices. For example, the shift in social networking likely reflects the use of Facebook using a PC to the use of 
Facebook from mobile devices. 
18 While these data are suggestive a more definitive analysis would require an analysis of diversion of traffic between sites 
and between categories.  We lack the data to do that but it should be one of the central exercises in competition policy 
matters to properly assess market definition.  
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increasing share of users and users’ online time, and may continue to attract an increasing share of 
online advertising dollars.”19 
 
C. WHO ONLINE PROPERTIES IDENTIFY AS COMPETITORS 
  
Attention seekers also say they compete against each other. To see which firms businesses 
say they compete with we have examined the 10-Ks for publicly traded online advertising-supported 
attention seekers that were in business in 2003, 2007, and 2011. The left hand column of Table 4 
lists web-based companies that were publicly traded in one of those years and were among the top-
50 web sites. The entries in the next three columns identify the firms they report as competitors. 
Of particular note is the fact that portals, search engines, social networks, and content 
websites treat the category boundaries as fluid, often listing competitors from multiple categories. 
Reference website answers.com lists Facebook’s Questions feature as a source of competition. 
Search engine ask.com, social network classmates.com, and product review website CNET.com all 
list portals AOL, MSN, and Yahoo! as competitors. LinkedIn.com sees itself as competing both with 
social networks like Facebook and with jobs websites like Monster.com, CareerBuilder.com, and 
Indeed.com. Local search website Yelp.com includes as competitors both traditional search engines 
like Google and Bing and social networks like Facebook.  Yahoo! provides an interesting example of 
the evolution of competition. In 2003 it identified Time Warner (AOL), Microsoft (MSN), Ask 
Jevees, Google, Looksmart, Amazon, and eBay as competitors. Over time, the list of competitors 
grew to include Facebook and web ad companies like ad.com, valueclick.com, DoubleClick Ad 
Exchange, and Google Ad Sense.20   
 
Table 4: Competition Identified by Publicly Traded Attention Seekers 
Company 2003 2007 2011 Notes 
Answers.com - Wikipedia, 
WebMD.com, 
TheFreeDictionary.com, 
Yahoo Answers, Askville, 
Answerbag, Search 
Engines 
Yahoo 
Answers (Yahoo!), 
Quora, Yedda (AOL), 
Answerbag.com 
(Demand Media), 
Aardvark (Google), 
Wikia, Askville 
(Amazon), Ask.com 
(IAC), StrackOverflow, 
ChaCha, Mahalo 
Answers, Hunch, eHow 
(Demand Media), 
Seed.com (AOL), 
About.com (NYT), 
Dictionary.com (IAC), 
HowStuffWorks 
 
 
19 Yahoo 10-K for the fiscal year ending December 31, 2011, p. 14. 
20 Yahoo! Form 10-K, various years. 
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(Discovery 
Communications), 
WikiHow, 
TheFreeDictionary.com, 
Wikipedia.org, Facebook 
Questions 
Ask.com Time Warner 
(AOL), Google, 
MSN, Yahoo!, 
Looksmart 
- Google, Yahoo!, Bing Acquired by IAC in 2005 
Classmates.com - Online Social 
Networking – LinkedIn, 
Reunion.com, 
Military.com, Yahoo!, 
MSN, AOL, White 
Pages, US Search 
Online Nostalgia 
Services – Facebook, 
Google+ 
Acquired by United 
Online in 2004 
CNET The New York 
Times, The Wall 
Street Journal, 
Fortune, Forbes,  
Business Week, 
PC Magazine, PC 
World, eWeek, 
IGN, GameSpy, 
Shopping.com, 
pricegrabber.com, 
BizRate.com, 
Amazon.com, 
eBay, 
BestBuy.com, 
Google, Yahoo! 
ING 
Entertainment, WSJ.com, 
Forbes.com, AOL, MSN, 
Yahoo!, Google, 
Shopping.com, 
Amazon.com, eBay, 
Epicurious 
- Acquired by CBS in May 
2008 
Demand Media 
(eHow, 
Cracked, Livestrong) 
- - Yahoo, AOL, WebMD, 
About.com, Jive 
Software, Lithium 
 
Facebook - - Google, Microsoft, 
Twitter, Cyworld, Mixi, 
Orkut, vKontakte 
 
Google - Microsoft, Yahoo! Yahoo!, Bing, Kayak, 
Monster, WebMD, 
Amazon, eBay 
 
InfoSpace Google, Yahoo!, 
MSN 
Google, Yahoo! Google, Yahoo!, Bing,  Changed name to 
Blucora in 2012 
iVillage.com Oxygen.com, 
Lifetime.com, 
Women’s 
Entertainment 
Network, 
Lifetime, AOL, 
MSN, Yahoo!, 
Amazon  
- - Bought by NBC 
Universal in 2006 
LinkedIn - - Facebook, Google, 
Microsoft, Twitter, Xing, 
Viadeo, salesforce.com, 
Monster + Hotjobs, 
CareerBuilder, 
Indeed.com, Taleo, 
BranchOut,  
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Yahoo! 
 
Time 
Warner (AOL), 
Microsoft (MSN), 
Ask Jeves, Inc., 
Google Inc., 
Looksmart, Ltd., 
Amazon, eBay 
 
Google Ad 
sense, Ad.com, 
Valueclick, Google, 
Microsoft, AOL, 
Facebook,  
News Corp, 
MySpace, Disney, CBS, 
and NBC 
 
Facebook, 
Google, Microsoft, AOL, 
Google AdSense, 
DoubleClick Ad 
Exchange, AOL's 
Ad.com, Microsoft 
Media Network 
 
Yelp - - Google, 
Yahoo!, Bing, Facebook, 
Microsoft 
 
 
    
It is an article of faith among competition policy practitioners that the markets that 
businesspeople talk do not necessarily correspond to the technical concept of the relevant antitrust 
market. While true in principle, the difference between the beliefs of businesspeople and the 
findings of antitrust analysis should raise concerns about the accuracy of the market definition 
analysis when the relevant antitrust market identifies very different competitive constraints than 
identified by the business people who are on the ground and engaged in competition. 
D. COMPETITION FROM MOBILE 
The analysis above severely understates the extent of competition faced by online attention 
seekers at the end of 2012. Web-based and native applications on mobile devices attract 
considerable attention from consumers. 
In the late 2000s consumers started buying smart phones that provided mobile access to the 
web and a device that enabled them to consume web-based content, and engage in other web-based 
activities, using their mobile handsets.  As of September 2012, 45 percent of Americans had a smart 
phone.21  In early 2010, Apple introduced the first popular tablet and other companies have followed 
with similar products.22  Consumers can access the web using Wi-Fi or wireless connections. 
Contemporaneous with the spread of mobile devices was the development of sophisticated 
mobile operating systems. The Apple iOS, which is integrated into Apple mobile devices, and the 
Android OS, open source software that is available to multiple hardware makers, are the leading 
operating systems.23  These operating systems make APIs available to developers and provide 
“application stores” that facilitate consumers obtaining free and paid applications for their mobile 
devices.  As of mid 2012 there were 650,000 applications available from the Apple application store 
and 600,000 from the Android application store.24  In October 2012 Microsoft introduced a new 
mobile operating system and has embarked on efforts, including encouraging developers to write 
 
21 Joanna Brenner, Pew Internet: Mobile Dec 4, 2012, available at: 
http://pewinternet.org/Commentary/2012/February/Pew-Internet-Mobile.aspx  
22 iPad and Tablet Computers, The New York Times updated: October 23, 2012 
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/subjects/i/ipad/index.html 
23 See http://www.zdnet.com/comscore-apple-continues-to-gain-on-google-in-u-s-market-share-7000006826/  
24 Engadget. N.p., n.d. Web. 17 Dec. 2012  http://www.engadget.com/2012/06/27/google-play-hits-600000-apps/  
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applications for it, to increase its presence.25 
There are two kinds of applications for mobile devices. Web-based applications are written 
using web-standard code (HTML 5, for example) and are accessed using a web browser.  Native 
applications are written for the specific operating system and hardware configuration and therefore 
can use all of these features.  Some of these applications are extensions of websites that people used 
to access primarily from personal computers. For example, a consumer can use OpenTable to make 
a reservation by going to its website from a personal computer, going to its website from a mobile 
device, or using the OpenTable application they downloaded for their mobile device.  Others are 
substitutes for traditional web-based applications.  For example, ShopKick provides rewards for 
going into certain stores but also helps consumers locate those stores.26  That diverts attention from 
the many websites that help consumers locate retailers. 
These hundreds of thousands of applications provide another way for people to spend their 
time and thereby divide their limited attention.  Some of the developers of these applications also 
compete for selling that attention to merchants and others.  For example, Shopkick provides the 
application to consumers for free. It makes money by selling the attention it gets from providing 
awards to the participating retailers who benefit from the additional store traffic. 
Mobile applications are a direct source of competition with attention seekers that are 
ordinarily accessed using personal computers. The development of mobile devices and operating 
systems, however, creates a further source rivalry for attention. The mobile operating system 
providers are competing for attention with each other. They are vying to attract more applications 
that attract attention because these applications increase the desirability of mobile devices with their 
operating systems.  They are also trying to attract more attention because they sell mobile 
advertising. In addition, the mobile operating system providers are competing for attention with 
businesses that have focused on securing attention from people who are surfing the web on their 
personal computers.  
 
E. ATTENTION RIVALRY 
Competition among online businesses has primarily involved coming up with clever ways to 
get people’s attention.  That has resulted in continual entry of new firms and the development of 
new services by existing ones. Incumbent firms recognize that they are competing with these firms 
for the attention of consumers.  That has a number of consequences for innovation, quality, and 
pricing. 
It is widely understood among analysts and media that follow online competition, and 
discussed openly by the online companies themselves, that the grand rivalry online in 2012 is 
 
25 Microsoft Unveils Windows Phone 8." News Center. Microsoft, 29 Oct. 2012. Available at: 
http://www.microsoft.com/en-us/news/press/2012/oct12/10-29windowsphone8pr.aspx  
26 The location-based application has a feature called “Find Lick” http://www.shopkick.com/about  
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between Amazon, Apple, Facebook, and Google.27 Microsoft wants to be a serious rival here too. 
Yet Amazon is an ecommerce business, Apple is primarily in the business of making mobile devices 
and computers, Facebook is in social networking, Google is in search although it is also behind 
Android, and Microsoft primarily sells software platforms and productivity applications although it 
also has a search engine and advertising business. This rivalry is not similar to the competition 
among the big automobile makers, mobile network operators, supermarkets, banks, or many other 
typical businesses where the rivals provide similar products and services. 
The continual upheaval also has implications for the business of selling attention to 
merchants, application developers, and others. The provision of more attention online puts pressure 
on the prices that attention providers can provide and also threatens to cut into the amount of 
attention that they are able to provide.  To document this, the next section concentrates on 
competition on among advertising-supported online attention seekers. 
  
III. COMPETITION AMONG ATTENTION SEEKERS 
   
Attention rivals face significant competitive constraints in seeking time from consumers. The 
evidence presented below demonstrates that attention seekers cannot profitably raise price above 
zero, must improve the quality of their services through frequent introduction of new features to 
prevent users from switching to rivals, face constant threats of entry by new attention seekers that 
will divert traffic from them, face continual threats that new or existing attention seekers will 
develop a drastic innovation that diverts massive amounts of traffic from them, and operate in a 
business that has low barriers to entry and exit. 
Differentiation among attention seekers tempers these competitive constraints. They could 
offer products and services that are particularly attractive to certain types of consumers or for 
attracting particular kinds of attention.  That could result in some significant market power in 
procuring attention that could translate into some significant market power in providing attention.  
Nevertheless, once we shift the focus to the broader competition for attention it is apparent that 
attention seeking appears highly competitive. For the purposes of the discussion below, we ignore 
the competition between online and offline attention seekers. But it is clear that they do impose 
some competitive constraints on each other. 
A.  SCARCITY OF ATTENTION 
Consumers have a limited amount of time available for providing attention. Of course 
consumers can increase the amount of time they spend online by diverting time from activities they 
engage in online and offline. But since many of the activities they engage in offline are essential—
such as sleeping, working, engaging in household chores—it becomes increasingly difficult to 
 
27 Vascellaro, Jessica and Sherr, Ian “Apple Veers Away From Google Veers Away From” Wall Street Journal 12 June 
2012; Kafka, Peter. “Eric Schmidt’s ‘Gang of Four’ Doesn’t have room for Microsoft.” 31 May 2011. 
http://allthingsd.com/20110531/eric-schmidts-gang-of-four-doesnt-have-room-for-microsoft/  
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persuade consumers to substitute online time for offline time.  This situation suggests that 
competition for attention is likely to result more in substitution between online activities—the 
intensive margin—rather than between online activities and everything else that people spend time 
on—the extensive margin. 
B. PRICING FOR SECURING ATTENTION 
Attention seekers typically charge a zero price to consumers for receiving valuable products 
and services.  It is well known that a zero price can be an equilibrium price for multi-sided platforms 
even when the provider is a monopoly. Therefore, a zero price does not necessarily say anything 
about the state of competition.  However, several factors suggest that this price is dictated by 
competition and would not necessarily be chosen by a monopolist. 
First, the price of zero applies to a wide range of attention seekers. In the physical world 
many media charge positive prices including most magazines, newspapers, and cable television 
providers.28  Zero prices are common mainly for physical media such as radio and over-the-air 
television that have significant technical limitations in imposing charges.  On the web, zero prices 
apply to search engines, online games, social networking, instant messaging, as well as news and 
entertainment.  
Second, it is widely understood that new attention seekers, even with those that have 
developed a drastic innovation, could not develop sufficient traffic if they were to charge a positive 
price. They have to take a zero price. According to  a digital marketing specialist “Subscriptions can 
only work with the super-premium end of a publisher's audience”.29 Consumers appear even more 
hostile to paying for content in the music and games sectors: 
Consumers won’t pay for recorded music in the future…it surely isn’t 
because people are listening to less music. It’s simply because the old 
adage holds true: why pay for something that you can get for 
free?…There is a deluge of great (and legal!) sites providing free 
music — including Pandora, YouTube, Spotify, Grooveshark, MOG, 
Rdio, and other online destinations.30 
These same consumers are saving their money and playing free 
online games, listening to free music on Pandora, canceling basic 
cable and watching free video on Hulu, and killing their landlines in 
favor of Skype. It's a consumer's paradise: The Web has become the 
 
28 In many cases these physical media charge consumers a price that is less than the marginal cost of production and 
distribution.  
29 Thurman, N. & Herbert, J. (2007). Paid content strategies for news websites: An 
empirical study of British newspapers' online business models. Journalism Practice, 1(2), 208 - 226. 
doi: 10.1080/17512780701275523 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17512780701275523> 
30 Music for Nothing and the Fans for Free 28 October 2011 http://allthingsd.com/20111028/music-for-nothing-and-
the-fans-for-free/ 
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biggest store in history and everything is 100% off.31 
Third, attention seekers that have tried to charge positive prices have lost significant traffic 
and have reverted to a zero price. For example, Tencent tried charging for its instant messaging 
service, QQ, in China in 2002. After a loss of traffic it went back to offering the basic service for 
free in 2003.32 Similarly, in the United States, The New York Post tried charging iPad users $6.99 a 
month to read the news that was free on the website, but reversed course after about a year.  
If you wanted to read the Post on your iPad, your only option was to 
install its iOS app and pay $6.99 a month for a subscription, or else 
use a browser other than Apple‘s pre-installed Safari. Almost exactly 
one year after slamming the gate shut, the Post has quietly rolled it 
back up, as NY Convergence noted. Opening nypost.com in Safari 
on the iPad now brings up a message inviting the user to download 
the Post’s app, but click “Cancel” and you’re free to browse the site 
just as you can on the web.33 
There are only a few exceptions to this experience.  They typically involve platforms that 
have particularly valuable content for some group of users.  The New York Times has made unlimited 
access to its content available only to subscribers, as has the Wall Street Journal. Other newspapers 
have tried and abandoned this approach. In 2010, The Times of London lost almost 90 percent of 
its online readership after making registration mandatory.  
The huge drop matches the industry expectation before the Times 
instituted the paywall that traffic would fall off by 90%, which is the 
standard experience when a site moves to a paid-access model instead 
of free access.34 
C. FEATURE COMPETITION 
Even successful web sites engage in constant feature competition to attract attention. 
Readers who use websites that seek attention are familiar with this.  Those who use smart mobile 
phones are reminded of feature competition when they are asked to update their applications to new 
releases; these updates occur many times over the space of the year. 
Firms introduce new features to persuade more consumers to visit these websites and to 
spend more time on those websites or, in other words, to secure more attention.  For example, 
Facebook plans to add search features in order to reduce its customers need to use Google, gaining 
 
31 Anderson, Chris. The Economics of Giving It Away; In a battered economy, free goods and services online are more 
attractive than ever. So how can the suppliers make a business model out of nothing? Wall Street Journal 31[TYPO?] Jan 
2009 http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=WSJO000020091008e51v006jn&cat=a&ep=ASE 
32 www.qq.com, http://www.shvoong.com/internet-and-technologies/websites/2298647-www-qq-com/ 
33 Bercovici, Jeff New York Post Piviots on iPad Strategy, Dropping Paywall 19 June 2012 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/jeffbercovici/2012/06/19/new-york-post-pivots-on-ipad-strategy-dropping-paywall/ 
34 Halliday, Josh. "Times Loses Almost 90% of Online Readership." Guardian 21 July 2010: n. pag. Web. 
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a greater share of their attention. “Mark Zuckerberg,” for example, “indicated that the social 
networking company would probably intensify its competition with Internet search giant Google, by 
giving its users more ways to search on its website.”35 Similarly, Monster, an online job board 
discussed in more detail in the next section, “…, is looking to capitalize on social networks. In June 
it launched an application, BeKnown,  “that encourages Facebook users to refer friends for jobs, or 
see what contacts are connected to a company where they’re seeking work.”36  
New features are introduced more frequently for web-based products than for other 
products including even software for personal computers.  It is relatively inexpensive to program 
websites and add features.  The hard part is coming up with innovations.  Implementing them can 
be fast and cheap. For example, Facebook observes that “it’s common to write code and have it 
running on the live site a few days later.”37 
D.  ENTRY  
There is frequent entry by advertising-supported online attention seekers. These range from 
small businesses such as blogs to ones that become large quickly such as Twitter.  Each month, 
Compete.com reports the top 15,000 websites by unique visitors. Out of the top 15,000 websites in 
the January 2012 list, 3,954 (26 percent) were replaced by different websites on the July 2012 list, just 
six months later.38 Many of these new entrants quickly grew to a substantial size. The largest 100 of 
them each had more than 150,000 hours of time, which would have placed them in the top sixth of 
the January 2012 list.39 Over a longer time period, out of the 15,000 websites in the September 2002 
list, 12,257 (82 percent) were replaced by different websites on the September 2012 list, a full ten 
years later.40 
As a consequence of this growth, the number of very large websites is growing.  Table 5 
shows the growth in the number of websites with more than one million hours of attention per 
month. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
35 Pathak, Mitra. “Zuckerberg: Facebook to intensify competiton with Google with more robust search engine.” 
TopNews.in12 Sept 2012. 
36 Zieminiski, Nick and Koyitty, Bikoy. “Insight: Facebook, LinkedIn threaten to slay Monster.com” Reuters.com 24 
Aug. 2011. 
37 “Careers at Facebook.” Facebook. Web. 17 Dec. 2012.2012. https://www.facebook.com/careers/teams/engineering. 
38 Some of these new websites do not represent new businesses, but are rather new websites for existing businesses. 
39 Compete.com database, January 2012 and July 2012. 
40 Compete.com, September 2002 to September 2012. 
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Table 5: Growth in the Number of Websites Attracting Large Amounts of Time Spent 
 Number of Websites Exceeding Threshold 
Threshold 
(Hours Per Month) 
September 2002 September 2007 September 2012 
1,000,000 95 224 453 
2,000,000 37 101 231 
5,000,000 16 38 89 
10,000,000 8 17 44 
20,000,000 4 9 21 
Source: Compete.com, September 2002, September 2007, and September 2012. 
These entrants reduced the amount of time obtained by existing websites. Table 6 shows 
how the share of time held by the top web sites in September 2002 changed over the course of the 
decade. As note above the total amount of time online roughly doubled over this time period. The 
share of time held by the top 10 websites in September 2002 fell from 32.2 percent to 12.9 percent 
in September 2012.  Other measures of the top websites had similar declines in the share of time.  
 
Table 6: Share of Time Spent at September 2002’s Top Websites over Time 
 Share of Time Spent Change (Percentage Points) 
 Sept-
2002 
Sept-
2007 
Sept-
2012 
Sept-2002 to 
Sept-2007 
Sept-2007 to 
Sept-2012 
Sept-2002 to 
Sept-2012 
Top 10 Websites in 
September 2002 
32.2% 21.2% 12.9% -11.0% -8.2% -19.3% 
Top 50 Websites in 
September 2002 
40.4% 25.1% 16.1% -15.4% -9.1% -24.4% 
Top 100 Websites in 
September 2002 
44.6% 27.0% 17.4% -17.6% -9.5% -27.1% 
Top 500 Websites in 
September 2002 
55.1% 34.5% 26.0% -20.8% -8.4% -29.1% 
Top 1000 Websites in 
September 2002 
60.0% 37.6% 28.2% -22.4% -9.3% -31.7% 
Top 5000 Websites in 
September 2002 
70.2% 43.2% 32.8% -26.9% -10.5% -37.4% 
Top 10,000 Websites in 
September 2002 
73.1% 45.0% 34.3% -28.1% -10.7% -38.8% 
Top 15,000 Websites in 
September 2002 
73.9% 45.4% 34.9% -28.5% -10.5% -39.0% 
Source: Compete.com, September 2002, September 2007, and September 2012. 
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E. DRASTIC INNOVATION 
Drastic innovations involving attention seeking have occurred frequently online in the last 
decade.  These drastic innovations result in the provision of what appear to be very different 
products and services than anyone has offered before. Some of these have garnered very large 
audiences. Table 7 lists the top 25 websites by unique visitors in August 2012, identifies their entry 
dates, and describes their services.41  Of these websites the author would consider 9 of them as 
having introduced a drastic innovation.  
Table 7 does not include the most dramatic innovation in the digital economy in the last 
decade:  smart mobile devices including smart phones and tablets.  A massive amount of consumer 
attention is now focused on using these devices and the applications that are available for them. 
Some web-based attention seekers have lost significant attention to mobile-based attention seekers.  
Zynga, for example, has lost significant traffic to its games, which were typically played on personal 
computers, to mobile game providers.42  It has therefore lost considerable advertising revenue as 
well.  
The frequency of these drastic innovations means that the attention that websites have 
secured is constantly up for grabs as new properties come into being.  This imposes significant 
competitive pressure to continue to innovate. 
  
 
41 Top 25 websites in August 2012 based on unique visitors as reported by Compete.com. The list of the top 25 websites 
in August 2012 based on unique visitors as reported by comScore is similar. The most significant exceptions involve the 
fact that comScore aggregates different domains owned by the same firm. This affects many properties, including 
Google (google.com, youtube.com, blogspot.com); Microsoft (microsoft.com, bing.com, msn.com, live.com); Glam 
Media (more than 1500 lifestyle websites and blogs);  Disney (disney.com, abcnews.com, cnet.com, espn.com, go.com); 
and AOL (aol.com; huffingtonpost.com). 
42 “Zynga has largely missed an opportunity to expand into mobile gaming because of its commitment to Facebook. 
Zynga’s best-know games are in decline…” Blueshift Research, “Zynga’s Dominance Threatened As Games Fade, EA 
Rises.” November 10, 2012 
http://blueshiftideas.com/reports/111103ZyngasDominanceThreatenedAsGamesFadeEARises.pdf  
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Table 7: Drastic Innovations by Top Websites 
 
Website Entry Date Services Drastic Innovation? 
google.com September 4, 1998 
(Incorporated) 
Search PageRank; Android 
facebook.com February 4, 2004 
(Launched) 
Social Networking Social Graph; Business Pages 
yahoo.com March 1, 1995 
(Incorporated) 
Portal First Successful Web Directory 
youtube.com February 14, 2005 
(Launched) 
Video Easy-to-use, nearly universal 
video storage format 
bing.com June 1, 2009 
(Preview Launch) 
Search  
amazon.com July 1995 
(First Sale) 
eCommerce Recommendation System; 
Kindle 
wikipedia.org January 15, 2001 
(Formal Launch) 
Reference World-Writable Encyclopedia 
msn.com August 24, 1995 
(Launch) 
News  
ask.com 1996 
(Founded) 
Search  
live.com November 1, 2005 
(Launched) 
Portal  
ebay.com September 3, 1995 
(Founded) 
eCommerce Buyer feedback to promote 
trust in auctions; Integration 
with Paypal 
blogspot.com August 23, 1999 
(Launched) 
Blog Hosting First Successful Blog 
Publishing Tool 
walmart.com January 2000 
(Launched) 
eCommerce  
microsoft.com 1994 
(Public Launch) 
Software  
go.com January 9, 1998 
(Launch) 
Search  
ehow.com March 1999 
(Launched) 
Reference  
craigslist.org 1996 
(Web Launch) 
Classifieds Successful Displacement of 
Newspaper Classifieds 
aol.com May 9, 1995 
(AOL adds web access, a browser, 
and a homepage to its service) 
Portal  
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F. NUMBER OF COMPETITORS 
 
Thousands of firms compete for consumer attention in this way on the Internet. Of the top 
500 websites, 135 primarily gather attention and sell it to advertisers, defined narrowly.  The HHI 
for these websites is 1345 based on time on site and assuming zero share for websites outside of the 
top 500; as a result of the zero share assumption this HHI is therefore overstated. The five largest 
sellers of attention have 67 percent of the attention garnered by these 135 websites. Defined slightly 
more broadly, 233 of the top 500 websites primarily gather attention and sell it to advertisers.43 The 
HHI for these websites is 1088, again assuming a zero share for websites outside of the top 500. The 
five largest attention sellers have 60 percent of the attention garnered by these 233 websites. 
Attention seeking is not a winner-take-all business. 
 
G. OTHER ATTENTION SEEKERS 
The analysis above may apply to online attention seekers more broadly.  Most attention 
seekers do not charge consumers for using their sites and provide them with a variety of services for 
free.  They may do that for the same reason advertising supported online attention seekers do—
competition for attention is so intense that it prevents businesses from profitably raising prices.  The 
other points concerning entry, turnover, feature competition, and drastic innovation hold as well.  It 
is likely that there is intense competition for selling attention for platforms that do not rely on 
advertising.   
Commerce-related online attention seekers compete not only with each other but also with 
advertising-supported online attention seekers as well as physical stores.  Consumers, for example, 
can conduct searches on Google for products and then buy directly from merchant websites; can 
conduct searches for products on Amazon or eBay and buy directly from these ecommerce sites or 
their affiliated stores; or increasingly look for offers on Facebook and buy from Facebook merchant 
pages.  These sites are competing for attention from consumers and providing that attention to 
merchants. 
Moreover, the mobile-based applications that encourage people to shop at physical stores 
provide increasing competition for web-based commerce-related, as well as advertising-related, 
attention seekers.  For example, FourSquare—a mobile-based application—connects users and 
 
43 Under the narrower definition, a website counts as an advertising-supported attention seeker if 1) it is consumer-
focused, and 2) its revenues come exclusively or almost exclusively from banner ads, search ads, or flat listing fees for 
items for sale. Under the broader definition, a website counts as an attention-seeker if 1) it is consumer focused, 2) it 
earns substantial revenue from banner ads, search ads, fees for items for sales (whether flat listing fees, commissions, 
revenue sharing, buyer fees, or sales lead fees), 3) its other revenue comes from advertising-related sources, such as 
consumer research, marketing campaign design, other marketing services, premium membership fees for consumers to 
avoid ads and/or receive additional services, and credits for virtual goods. 
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businesses.  Rather than searching online for merchants, and purchasing either online or at a 
physical location, the application can suggest physical stores that are near an individual (using smart 
phone features that allow the detection of location). This application attracts attention from people 
and it provides a substitute for merchants with physical locations to obtain sales. 
IV. COMPETITION AMONG ATTENTION PROVIDERS  
 
As of April 2012, LinkedIn had 150 million members who have professional profiles on its 
site and can connect, and then communicate, with other members who have agreed to a 
relationship. Over the last decade LinkedIn has added numerous products and services for its users 
that has helped attract this attention. 44 Its users get many of these products and services for free. It 
also lets software developers access certain features of the network for free by providing them with 
APIs and plugins.45 Yet, despite offering most these products and services for free, LinkedIn had 
revenue of $522 million in 2011. Half of that revenue came from making its members available to 
companies and others that were looking into hiring people. In fact formal and informal job search is 
a main part of the LinkedIn business.46 Another 30 percent came from selling space on pages viewed 
by members to advertisers. The remaining 20 percent came from selling premium packages; these 
mainly provided enhanced services for members to communicate with people outside of their 
networks.   
 
A. MULTI-SIDED ATTENTION RIVALS 
Like LinkedIn many attention rivals earn revenue by selling attention to advertisers. Some of 
these attention rivals are similar to traditional advertising-supported media platforms such as 
newspapers, magazines, and television.  They provide news and entertainment to attract viewers and 
then sell display-advertising spots on their pages. Because they are software-based media properties, 
however, attention rivals can engage in highly targeted advertising customized to the person viewing 
the advertisement. Others provide services that do not have widely used counterparts off of the 
web. Social networks provide a variety of services related to finding, organizing, and communication 
with personal or professional connections. They then sell access to the web pages related to the 
provision of these services to advertisers.  Search engines enable users to find content on websites, 
display the results on search-results pages, and then sell advertisers spots on those pages.47  Some 
 
44 LinkedIn’s produces and services include the following: LinkedIn Connections, Invitations, People You May Know, 
Addressbook Importer, LinkedIn Today, Personalization Platform, LinkedIn Alumni, Mobile, APIs, Widgets, LinkedIn 
Corporate, Solutions/Recruiter, LinkedIn Referral Engine, LinkedIn Recruitment Media, Job Seeker Basic, Job Seeker 
Plus, LinkedIn Ads, Display Ads, Custom Groups, Recommendation Ads, InMail, Profile Organizer, LinkedIn for 
Salesforce, LinkedIn, Inc., 2011 Form 10-K, at 4. 
45 See https://developer.linkedin.com/whydevelop  
46 Mikolaj Piskorski (2007), “LinkedIn (A)” Harvard Business School Case Study, 9-707-406.  
47 Search engines are similar to printed yellow page. The providers of these business directories sell advertising on the 
directory pages.  
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attention seekers also earn revenue from applications that run on their platforms. Social game 
providers, for example, have to pay a percentage of their revenues to Facebook. 
 Advertising-supported attention rivals help merchants by providing marketing messages that 
can lead to sales.  Other attention rivals operate online shopping malls—or more generally 
ecommerce sites—where the possibility of shopping draws attention and the site enables the user to 
buy the product directly from the site or from a store that has a link to the site.  In this case the 
consumer is allowed to shop and receive various services such as reviews and ratings for free and the 
attention-seeking platform makes money from charging manufacturers, if it is selling on its own 
account, or merchants, if it is using a shopping-mall model.  Given that consumers have limited time 
as they surf the web they need to make decisions on whether to use a general or specialized search 
engine to look for products or go to an ecommerce site to search for products. Likewise merchants 
need to make decisions on the extent to which they should engage in search-based advertising versus 
transaction fees to ecommerce sites they engage in a different form of advertising. 
Some attention rivals have more complex models as we saw with Apple earlier.  Apple’s 
mobile device platform, which is based on integrated software and hardware, connects consumers, 
mobile carriers, applications developers, content providers, and advertisers.  Many of the 
applications that use its platform are advertising-supported attention-seeking platforms.  By 
encouraging the development of applications for its phones Apple competes to get more attention 
for its platform than for competing platforms. It makes money from that by selling more phones, 
more content through iTunes, and more advertising. 
 
B. ADVERTISER’S PURSUIT OF ROI AND COMPETITION FOR SELLING ATTENTION 
Online advertising-supported attention rivals sell many different kinds of advertising.  These 
include search-based, social media, and display advertising.  The advertisements themselves range 
from short text ads to image-heavy display ads to video ads. Some, primarily display ads, are sold 
based on the number of people who see the ads while others are sold based on whether individuals 
click on the ads.  Most online advertising is targeted based on information, or educated guesses, 
about the person looking at the screen at a particular point in time. 
Advertisers buy online advertising because they want to sell products and services to 
consumers—to obtain what are called “conversions”.  They therefore make decisions on how much 
to spend on advertising and how to allocate that spending across different advertising channels—
offline as well as online—by comparing the rate of return on incremental investment across 
different channels.  Historically, advertisers have faced challenges in making these decisions 
rigorously because of lack of data on the relationship between advertising spending and conversions.  
They have had to make them judgmentally based on a mixture of subjective and objective 
information.   
In recent years, however, advertisers have started using sophisticated software—known as 
cross-channel attribution technologies—for determining the marginal return on investment of 
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expenditures on different channels.48  These technologies collect data on who has seen various ads, 
match that data to information on whether there was a sale, assess the importance of different ads in 
generating that sale and in some cases make provide dynamic reallocations of advertising budgets 
across sales channels based on results.49  A survey of 607 entities in late 2011 found that 77 percent 
of advertising agencies and 62 percent of markets used these technologies.50  
A study of 53 marketers examined how they used cross-channel attribution technologies.51  
Virtually all of them used it to “measure the value and performance of digital channels” (98 percent).  
Almost two thirds (64 percent) “use attribution to make improvements to in-flight or future 
interactive marketing strategies like channel allocation and media planning optimization.”  They used 
these attribution technologies to examine many different channels.  More than 70 percent of the 
markets said they considered paid search, online display, natural search, affiliate partners and email.  
More than a third also considered Facebook posts, comparison shopping engines, Twitter, online 
video ads, and the brand’s own website. 
The existence and widespread use of cross-channel marketing technologies shows that 
advertisers (or advertising and marketing firms which serve as their agents) see different online 
channels as substitutes. Otherwise they would not be using products that facilitate the comparison 
of their marginal returns on investment.  The availability and widespread use of these technologies 
also makes it likely that these different channels have relatively high degrees of substitution.  
Advertisers compare them using a single metric and can make quick adjustments to their campaigns 
depending on the rates of return, which depend on costs and results.  In fact, the survey of 607 
marketers and agencies discussed above found that users of channel-attribution technologies 
changed their spending as result of their use of these technologies. As shown in Figure 2, responses 
from 179 of those surveyed shows that they appeared to have substituted between both online 
media as well as between online and offline media. 
 
C.  MARKET DEFINITION AND MARKET POWER FOR MULTI-SIDED PLATFORMS 
It is now well established that the analysis of competitive constraints differs in material ways 
for multi-sided firms that serve as intermediaries between multiple, distinct and interdependent 
customer groups compared with single-sided firms that do not serve customers with interdependent 
 
48 Catherine Tucker (2012), op. cit. 
49 According to marketing material for Visual IQ’s IQ Intelligence Suite, which is one of the leading cross-channel 
attribution technologies, “Once your marketing performance data and customer data (and any other data you wish to 
include) has been collected, formatted, normalized and integrated during the software set-up process, IQ Insight 
presents it to you through its powerful, yet easy to use dashboard and reporting interface. This allows you the flexibility 
to view, report upon and compare the performance of every channel, campaign and marketing tactic side by side, and to 
analyze that performance by any criteria specific to your company, industry or business model. IQ Insight provides both 
executive overview and granular views of your marketing ecosystem using a common set of your own key performance 
indicators (KPIs).”http://www.visualiq.com/products/iq-intelligence-suite (Visited 9 November 2012). 
50 Econsultancy (2012). The data were collected from September 26-October 23, 2011; of 607 respondents, 44 percent 
were located in North America and 33 percent were in the United Kingdom. 
51 Forrester Interactive Attribution (2012) 
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demands.52  As a result of these differences standard tools used in antitrust analysis for assessing 
market definition are not applicable, at least not without substantial modification, to multi-sided 
platforms. 
The analysis of multi-sided market definition and market power will depend on the particular 
factual circumstances of the attention rivals considered.  However, it is useful to make several 
points.  
First, consumers on-line typically “surf” websites and therefore divide their limited attention 
across these sites.53 They engage in multi-homing at least with respect to attention seekers generally.  
As a result, advertisers that want some attention from consumers have a number of choices—
subject to the differentiation issues discussed below—to obtain that attention.  Viewers are not a 
“competitive bottleneck” in the sense that term is used in the multi-sided platform literature.54 
Second, although consumers multi-home they have limited attention. As a result of that 
there is intense competition for viewers as shown in the previous two sections.  Attention seekers 
compete aggressively for viewers not because they have a monopoly on that time when they get it—
the point of the competitive bottleneck argument based on single homing—but because there is 
only so much time to get.  It is the scarcity of time, not single-homing, that appears to drive 
competition for viewers. 
 
 
52 See Evans and Schmalensee (2012), op. cit., for a survey. 
53 See Athey, Susan, Emilio Calvano, and Joshua S. Gans (2012), The Impact of the Internet on Advertising Markets for News 
Media, Working Paper. These authors develop a model that assumes that some people use one platform while others 
stochastically search the web.  They show that under this realistic assumption many of the results of earlier models that 
assumed single-homing are reversed. 
54 See Armstrong, Mark (2006), Competition in Two-Sided Markets, RAND Journal of Economics, 37:668-691. 
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Third, a key source of differentiation among multi-sided platforms concerns the kinds of 
customers they make available to each side.  In the case of advertising-supported media platforms 
some businesses specialize in securing particular kinds of customers—middle-age male professionals 
in the financial services industry or young Moms for example—that are valuable to customers on the 
other side—potential buyers of luxury cars or diapers.    
V. PRODUCT DIFFERENTION AND ATTENTION SEEKING 
 Attention rivals are obviously dramatically different from each other.  Twitter provides a 
very different service to viewers (microblogging) than Yahoo (content curation). Twitter also 
provides a very different service to advertisers—tweets with short urls for links—than Yahoo—
multi-color display ads. The point of this Article, though, is that those differences are not necessarily 
relevant for assessing competition among online platforms.  These attention rivals are all competing 
aggressively with each other to secure attention. The emergence of Twitter likely took viewers away 
from Yahoo. And the fact that services like Twitter can become quickly established and grew 
explosively puts constant pressure on attention seekers.  These attention rivals then compete for 
advertisers to buy access to some of that attention. But advertisers are constantly looking for ways to 
move the budgets between different channels to get what they often really want—a sale.  They do 
not necessarily care whether that sale came from a tweet, a search, a social network ad, or a variety 
of other media. 
This indifference to differences has limits though. It does not necessarily apply to other 
aspects of the attention that is procured and provided. There could be differences among the people 
providing attention.  An advertiser seeking to sell an expensive automobile is interested in getting 
the attention of high-income people who are likely in the market for buying a car.  The attention of a 
teenage game player is not a substitute. There could also be differences in the manner in which 
attention is generated which in turn reduces substitution possibilities. The value of messages that are 
delivered on a search results page, as a display advertisement on a web page, or as part of a web-
based video could differ.  There are differences in the formats that are dictated in part by the 
method of producing the attention. The context in which the attention is generated could also lead 
to differences in the value of attention to advertisers. Such product differentiation could result in 
some attention seekers, or some segments of attention seekers, having significant market power.55 
 
55 Different sources of attention may have different values to advertisers because of differences in “how attentive” 
people are to advertisements on the property and the context in which they are seeing the advertisements.  These 
differences between source of attention lead to differences in the likelihood that a view by a consumer will result in a 
“conversion”—that is a sale of a good—for the merchant.  However, these differences do not necessarily lead to 
traditional product differentiation issues.  For example, if property A leads to 10 percent of the conversions per person 
viewing an advertisement as property B, and that is the only difference, the price for showing an ad to a person on 
property B would be 10 percent of the price of the same advertisement on property B.  At these prices the two 
properties would be close substitutes.   For example, it is much “cheaper” per click to buy display ads on Facebook than 
to buy search ads on Google. But the Facebook ads result in much fewer conversions per click than do the Google ads. 
Larry Kim (2012), “Google Display Network vs. Facebook Advertising,” Wordstream, May 15, 2012, available at 
http://www.wordstream.com/blog/ws/2012/05/15/ipo-facebook-vs-google-display-advertising; JCD Repair, “Google 
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Whether the heterogeneity for attention matters for antitrust analysis comes down to two 
critical issues.  First, how substitutable are the different sources of attention?  Second, how easily can 
attention providers move into different types of attention?  Both of these issues need to be analyzed 
in the particular case at hand and it is therefore not possible to generalize.  However, as we show 
below, while product differentiation is likely to be important in evaluating competitive constraints 
for attention rivals there are factors specific to online advertising that reduce the extent to which 
product differentiation can soften the competition among rivals. 
 
A. SUBSTITUTION FOR ATTENTION 
We address the two dimensions of substitution identified above: substitution among the 
people providing attention and substitution among message delivery vehicles. 
 
1. Differences across People Providing Attention 
Advertisers are interested in reaching consumers that are likely to be interested in buying 
their products.  Media businesses help advertisers reach these likely buyers by fashioning content 
that will tend to attract the right audience.  Different sections of newspapers appeal to different 
types of readers such as fashion for women and sports for men.  Television networks program 
different types of shows sometimes tied to the time of day to attract different demographic groups 
such as moms or teenagers.  Some media businesses develop properties that are designed to attract a 
particular audience that is valuable to a particular kind of advertiser.  A magazine such as Vogue 
attracts women interested in fashion and businesses that have products that appeal to fashion-
conscious women. 
It may appear that it is not possible to substitute two media properties that have specialized 
in attracting a different audience. Neither readers nor advertisers could readily substitute Fly 
Fisherman for Creative Knitting.  That does not mean, however, that these specialized magazines only 
face competition from similarly specialized magazines.  An advertiser could reach individuals 
interested in knitting by buying space in more general publications ranging from magazines targeted 
towards older people to publications for a general audience. 
For an advertiser, the issue of substitution comes down to determining the ROIs of 
alternative vehicles.  Most physical publications charge a fee for placing an ad that is determined in 
part by the number of likely viewers of that ad.  The average cost of reaching a relevant reader 
depends on the average cost of reaching all readers and the likelihood that those readers are relevant. 
The supply of attention by more general publications may constrain the prices charged by specialty 
publications depending upon their relative prices and reach of relevant viewers. 
Physical properties typically show all users the same message.  Everyone who watches the 
Super Bowl will see the same ads at half time and everyone who reads the metropolitan edition of 
 
Adwords vs. Facebook Ads – It Was No Contest,” June 19, 2012, available at http://www.jcdrepair.com/blog/google-
adwords-vs-facebook-ads-it-was-no-contest/645. 
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the New York Times will see the same advertisement on the upper right-hand side of page 3. 
 Online properties, on the other hand, deliver messages in real time and can tailor the 
message to information that’s available on the viewer.  Typically, when an individual opens a web 
page the advertising technology will almost instantaneously make a decision on what messages to 
insert into the space reserved for advertising.  For most properties, that decision is based in part on 
information—of varying degrees of reliability—concerning the person viewing the space.  As a 
result advertisers that want to reach particular types of people can better evaluate the ROI of various 
alternatives. A supplier of knitting related goods could therefore place an ad in 
www.knittinguniverse.com, place search-based ads tied to search keywords related to knitting, place 
contextual ads tied to keywords related to knitting in content viewed by people, and place ads that 
are targeted to demographic groups that are likely to be interested in knitting. 
As a result of online targeting it is possible that many very different types of media compete 
against each other for supplying attention even for very specialized advertisers.  In fact, all of the 
online advertising considered by channel-attribution technologies, discussed above, provide for 
personal targeting and in some cases quite narrowly defined targeting.   
2. Differences across Delivery Vehicles for Attention 
There are also differences across attention seekers in how the message is delivered to 
viewers. 
One aspect concerns the differences in the format of the message. Some attention seekers 
only provide small ads that consist mainly of text, others larger ads often with pictures, and still 
others embed video ads. Advertisers would presumably design their ads to be most effective given 
the type of delivery vehicle they are using. Nevertheless, even after this optimization, it is possible 
that the impact of the message on the consumer, and therefore the ROI for the advertiser, could 
depend on the format. 
Another aspect concerns differences in the context in which the message is presented.  
Social networks show ads on pages that typically organize information concerning personal and 
professional networks.  Web portals show ads on pages that have content that people have chosen 
to see and that content may provide a proxy that enables the portal to deliver a relevant 
advertisement.  People see search-based ads that are related to keywords they have entered.  The 
context in which the message is delivered could affect the likelihood that an advertiser will either 
make a sale or improve its brand image and therefore affect the ROI for that message. 
In fact, a basic craft of advertising involves assessing judgmentally, and increasingly through 
sophisticated models as discussed above, the relative ROI of alternative media and allocating 
budgets across the media to optimize the impact of advertising campaigns.    
  
B. ENTRY, PROLIFERATION AND REPOSITIONING  
It is much easier for online attention seekers to enter, add new products and services, and 
reposition themselves than it is for physical attention seekers.  The fixed costs of starting a web-
based property are much lower as are the distribution costs.  It costs little to add pages or sections to 
websites.  As a result it is possible to add new products and services with an existing platform.  
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Finally, because the costs of entry, addition, and change are low it is cheaper for a web-based 
property to reposition itself. 
Economists who consider models of product differentiation often assume that firms locate 
themselves in a particular place and that this location is permanent or at least cannot be changed in 
the short run.  This assumption is not true for web businesses generally or attention seekers in 
particular.   
 
C. COMPETITION AMONG ONLINE ATTENTION SEEKERS 
This Article does not presume to substitute for the fact-intensive investigation that is 
ordinarily required to assess competitive constraints and their implications for market definition and 
market power in actual cases.  However, the analysis of online attention rivals above suggests that 
there is a presumption that seeking and providing attention is highly competitive even if we just 
focus on advertising-supported online attention rivals.  More importantly, though, the analysis 
indicates that attention rivals compete with each other across boundaries that would be defined for 
narrowly construed products and services. 
The key point is that the relevant metric for assessing competitive constraints is 
“attention”—the time that consumers focus their minds on content online and the portion of that 
time that advertisers (or others) obtain.  The products and services that help secure that attention—
the opportunity to tweet, to post a message to your friends, to conduct a search, to play a game on 
your mobile—are all in competition with each other to obtain that attention.  They are substitutes.  
The products and services that made a portion of that time available to advertisers (or others)—a 
tweet, a small text ad on the side of the newsfeed, a small text ad on the side of organic search 
results, or a small ad at the bottom of the mobile phone screen—are all in competition with each 
other to provide a way for advertisers to make a sale. 
That point does not imply that “attention rivals” are all in the same market or that any of 
them necessarily lacks market power.  Those products and services may have an effect on the types 
of consumer attention that is acquired or the effectiveness in which it can generate sales for 
particular advertisers.  Differentiation is still an important concept for antitrust analysis to consider 
in assessing market definition, market power, and competitive effects. 
 
D. EXTENSION TO OFFLINE ATTENTION SEEKERS 
There are reasonable arguments for why different types of offline attention seekers do not 
compete with each other.  Consider offline advertising-supported platforms.  Historically advertisers 
did not have good data for comparing the effectiveness of television, radio and print advertising.  
Their budgeting and allocation decisions were therefore highly judgmental.  These media were 
different from each other and therefore arguably served different advertising purposes.  Entry and 
expansion was much harder than it is for online advertising. Television and radio required licenses 
and could only broadcast a fixed amount of time and to some extent in separate geographic areas.  It 
would also be hard to argue that advertising-supported platforms were close substitutes for 
commerce platforms such as shopping malls if for no other reason than the time cost and 
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inconvenience of travel. 
The emergence of online advertising and development of sophisticated technologies has 
changed this in several ways.  The fact that it is possible to measure and determine incremental 
returns of investment for online attention seeking places pressure to consider the same issues for 
offline attention seeking. Knowing the ROI for online display advertising encourages advertisers to 
think through the likely ROI for offline advertising to make budgeting decisions.  In addition, the 
development of computer technologies has made it increasingly possible to measure conversions 
physical advertising—such as using coupon codes in print advertising.  As noted above, some of the 
cross-channel attribution technologies compare online with offline advertising channels. Figure 2 
showed that this comparison has encouraged substitution particularly away from print and towards 
online.  Goldfarb and Tucker have also found evidence of substitution between online and offline 
advertising.56 The online and offline worlds for commerce are converging and this is likely to 
increase to degree of substitution.  The use of mobile devices is bringing the online world into 
physical spaces.  Advertisers and marketers are using increasingly mobile applications to drive 
physical commerce.57 
VI. APPLICATIONS TO ANTITRUST 
 
The competition among attention rivals described above does not imply that antitrust should 
reduce the vigor with which it examines mergers and exclusionary practices among these platforms.  
It just needs to look for problems in the right places. 
Market definition and market power analyses that focus on products and services that have 
similar observable characteristics but ignore constraints resulting from the broader static and 
dynamic competition for attention could result in false positive errors in decisions.  Competition 
authorities and courts would tend to find anticompetitive effects when in fact the practices at issue 
would result in an increase in welfare. For example, consider a merger among similar media 
properties. The combination could increase positive feedback effects or scale economies and thereby 
benefit consumers and advertisers. Based on a constricted view of the relevant market, a 
competition authority could conclude that the merger would result in an increase in prices when in 
fact competition with other attention seekers in combination with potential entry would keep prices 
and quality from changing to the detriment of consumers. 
Ignoring these competitive constraints, however, can also lead to false negative errors in 
decisions.  That results from viewing attention seeking as consisting of many markets drawn 
 
56 Goldfarb, Avi and Tucker, Catherine, Substitution between Offline and Online Advertising Markets (November 30, 
2010). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1721001 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1721001 
57 E Chantal Tode, Macy’s makes mobile integral part of Black Friday strategy to drive in-store sales. Mobile Commerce 
Daily, November 6, 2012  http://www.mobilecommercedaily.com/macy%E2%80%99s-enhances-mobile-app-to-
facilitate-shopping-on-black-friday  Fairmont Hotels enhances foursquare check-ins with location-based offers 
http://www.mobilecommercedaily.com/fairmont-hotels-enhances-foursquare-check-ins-with-location-based-offers 
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narrowly based on products and services—including advertising formats—as similar.  Competition 
authorities and courts could approve combinations, and fail to object to exclusionary practices, 
across those boundaries based on the erroneous conclusion that firms do not compete and therefore 
competition could not be harmed.  For example, consider a merger of two attention seekers that 
have different ways of securing attention and of making that attention available to advertisers.  The 
combination might not lead to any positive feedback effects or scale economies because of these 
differences.  But under certain circumstances it could result in reduced feature competition for 
attention as well as higher advertising prices. 
The key insight of this paper is that many online platforms are in the business of harvesting 
attention and then reselling it to merchants who use that attention to sell their own products.  This 
way of looking at these platforms has significant implications for antitrust analysis. Ordinarily, 
antitrust analysis examines the products and services that businesses provide and focuses on 
substitution in demand and supply.  The particular details of how those products and services are 
actually made—the details of the tools, machines, and human capital—is not a central focus of that 
inquiry.  In the case of attention rivals, attention is the product that is being harvested, repackaged 
and sold. The things that are often thought of as the products and services—search engines, social 
graphs, tweets, ecommerce storefronts, and so forth—are really just the tools for harvesting, 
repackaging and selling attention.  Sometimes those tools matter. But, as in antitrust generally, it is 
really the substitution possibilities for the underlying good—here attention—that matters. 
The remainder of this section considers two decided merger matters and an exclusionary 
practices case to illustrate the application of the insights discussed above. 
 
A. MICROSOFT’S ACQUISITION OF SKYPE 
The European Commission’s decision approving Microsoft’s acquisition of Skype echoes 
many of themes discussed above. Skype is an Internet-based company. It provides software that 
enables people to communicate over the Internet through instant messaging, voice calls, and video 
calls.  Microsoft agreed to acquire Skype in 2011 for $8.5 billion.  Among other things Microsoft 
also has an Internet-based communication service call “Windows Live Messenger” (WLM).58  The 
combination would result in Microsoft having an 80-90 percent share of video calls in the European 
Economic Area (EEA). Yet the European Commission considered the merger and approved it 
without conditions.59 
The Commission recognized the ease of entry into web-based businesses and how quickly 
these new businesses could grow: 
 
• “… the use of sites such as Facebook, Google+, LinkedIn and Twitter has more 
than doubled since January 2009.” 
 
58 Skype and Microsoft provide communication services to consumers and enterprises. For the sake of brevity this 
section just considers the merger issues relevant for the consumer services. 
59 [EC Microsoft Skype Decision] Case No. Comp/M.6281-Microsoft/Skype, 7/10/2011, p. 20.  
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• “The Commission observes several recent entries into the consumer 
communications services markets.  The example of Viber Media … shows that it is 
possible even for a small company to enter the market and attract a significant number 
of users within a short period of time.” 
• “The Commission notes that IM is a dynamic market, as illustrated by the fast 
growth of Facebook that has become the leader for IM in less than three years with a 
market share of approximately 50%.” 
• “ … smaller players have succeeded in rapidly entering, and gaining traction in the 
consumer communications sector with innovative products.” 
 
In addition, existing firms innovate and add new features constantly. 
 
• “The innovation cycles in these markets are short.  As a result, software and 
platforms are constantly being redeveloped.  Innovators generally enjoy a short lead in 
the market.” 
 
This innovation is important because feature competition is important. 
 
• “Since consumer communications services are mainly provided for free, consumers 
pay more attention to other features. Quality is therefore a significant parameter of 
competition.” 
 
• “Consumers are very sensitive to innovative services or products in consumer 
communications services. Providers … lose traction quickly if they are unable to offer 
users new and innovative functionality.  For example, Skype’s innovations over the last 
eight years highlight the critical role innovation players in its success….” 
 
The Internet-based communication providers are also price takers 
  
• “These markets, and this is also true for video calls, are currently free of charge.  If a 
company were to charge for its service, competitors would switch to alternative 
providers offering their service free of charge.  This is confirmed by internal documents 
of Skype showing that [>75%] of its users would switch to an alternative provider is 
Skype started charging for its free service (in particular for video calls).” 
 
The Commission declined to define communication markets based on functionality given 
the ease with which consumers could switch between different services.  And, while it also declined 
to define specific markets, its decision to approve the merger is clearly based on finding that ease of 
entry, feature competition, price-taking behavior, and rapid innovation defeated the exercise of 
market power.  Despite finding that Microsoft would obtain a dominant position in video calling it 
approved the acquisition without conditions.  In doing so it specifically relied on evidence that the 
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providers are price takers and would lose customers if they did not compete on feature innovation.  
 
B. MONSTER’S ACQUISITION OF HOT JOBS 
Monster announced plans to acquire Hot Jobs in late 2001.60  The Federal Trade 
Commission undertook a lengthy review on the combination of these two online job boards. It 
appeared that it would block the transaction. Yahoo!, then the largest Internet portal, entered a 
competing bid and touted that it would pose less regulatory risk. Monster and HotJobs ended their 
plans to combine.61 HotJobs accepted Yahoo!’s bid. The FTC approved the transaction after a short 
review.  Monster offered to buy HotJobs from Yahoo! in 2010. Yahoo! accepted the offer. This 
time, but not after issuing a Second Request and going through an intense review, the FTC did not 
object to the acquisition or impose any conditions. The analysis of the proposed combination of 
these job boards highlights the breadth of competitive constraints for attention seekers as well as the 
role of product differentiation in narrowing the scope of relevant markets. 
Job boards are websites that enable companies to advertise positions. They typically sell 
companies the ability to have a job posting which runs for a period of time such as a month.  The 
posts are indexed according to the type of position, location, and other attributes.  People looking 
for jobs can come to the website and search for a position.  They are then typically directed to the 
advertiser’s website to apply.  Some job boards operate a resume database where job seekers can 
post a resume and employers can look for candidates. As with many advertisers, large employers can 
obtain annual volume-based contracts. 
Job boards need to get people to pay attention to them. That is easier than it is for many 
attention-seekers since people who want jobs value relevant postings.  However, often employers 
place a greater value on people who are not looking for a job. Poorer workers self-select into being 
active job lookers while better worker do not. Therefore, job boards also look into various ways of 
getting attention from what are termed passive job lookers—people who might be interested if the 
right opportunity presented itself. 
Employers get workers from a variety of sources including recruiters, advertisements on 
their own websites, and advertisements in offline media.  Large employers which account for a 
significant fraction of the revenue for job boards usually have human resources departments which 
manage the effort of securing applicants, deciding among them, and following the success of 
workers they have hired.  Many of these large employers use sophisticated software that assesses the 
effectiveness—essentially an ROI—of various ways of recruiting workers.62 That is similar to 
 
60 Monster Worldwide, TMP Worldwide Reaffirms Commitment to HotJobs Acquisition, Dec. 12, 2001, available at 
http://www.about-monster.com/content/tmp-worldwide-reaffirms-commitment-hotjobs-acquisition. At the time 
Monster was owned and operated by TMP, a global human resources firm, which started in 1967. 
61 "Federal Trade Commission Hints at Tough Position on Mergers between Online Competitors." WilmerHale., 21 Mar. 
2001. Web. 17 Dec. 2012. Available at: 
http://www.wilmerhale.com/pages/publicationsandNewsDetail.aspx?NewsPubId=92779. 
62 For example, the popular HR software system, PeopleSoft Talent Management, has a tool that helps assess the ROI of 
different recruiting methods. “Oracle's talent management modules cover all phases of the talent lifecycle – planning, 
 
Evans: Attention Rivalry among Online Platforms 
 38 
traditional advertising and specifically to the cross-channel attribution technologies discussed above. 
The online job boards started soon after the start of the commercial Internet in the mid 
1990s.  By 2001, the industry was dominated by three large companies Monster.com with 15 million 
resumes on file, HotJobs.com with 5 million, and CareerBuilder with 4.5 million.63 The FTC made 
its initial view based on a snapshot of the roughly six-year old web economy.  After that there was 
remarkable entry, growth, and upheaval among the online job boards.  By 2008 CareerBuilder and 
Monster were about the same size, HotJobs had declined significantly, and hundreds of firms had 
started job boards.64  Four years later, in 2012, it is apparent that in addition to these firms, social 
networking sites that were not necessarily perceived as job boards in the late 2000s compete with job 
boards as well. “Hiring solutions” accounted for $261 million (50 percent) of LinkedIn’s $522 
million revenue in 2011. That is more than a quarter of the roughly $1 billion of revenue that 
Monster Worldwide earned in that year.65 
 During the consideration of the Monster and Yahoo! offers in the early 2000s it is apparent 
that the FTC reached two conclusions. The first was that the consolidation of the two largest online 
job boards could result in a significant reduction of competition.  The second was that the 
consolidation of second largest job board and the largest attention seeker of the time did not raise 
any competition concerns.  The analysis in this Article suggests that the first conclusion was likely 
wrong and the second was perhaps too quick. 
The worries over the combination of Monster and HotJobs apparently discounted the fact 
that entry on the web is easy and that growth can be rapid. At the time of the FTC’s decision a 
common view—espoused by some economists who specialized in the field of network effects and 
adopted by many of the analysts following the web—was that by building traffic web properties 
would achieve network effects that would make it almost impossible for them to be displaced.  
Subsequent experience has in fact shown how fragile the positions of leaders on the web are as we 
saw earlier. There is no obvious reason why the combination of Monster and HotJobs in 2002 
would have slowed the rise of the many alternatives that started or grew rapidly.  At the same time 
there are indirect network effects for job boards and it is possible that the combination could have 
increased the efficiency of job matches. 
The FTC apparently thought that letting Yahoo! acquire HotJobs was not an issue since they 
did different things. Yahoo! provided a spectrum of services designed to attract attention, which it 
then sold to advertisers.  Around this time Yahoo! accounted for 13 percent of time spent on the 
web—and more if we focused on pure attention seekers.66  If one is concerned about network 
 
recruiting, performance, learning, career development, succession planning, compensation, talent reviews and measuring 
and reporting.” Oracle, http://www.oracle.com/us/products/applications/peoplesoft-enterprise/human-capital-
management/talent-management/features/index.html 
63 Justin Pope (2002), “Online Job Sites Face Changed Landscape,” Associated Press Newswires, February 21, 2002. 
64 Robin Goldwyn Blumenthal (2009), “Turning into a Monster of a Competitor,” Barron’s, September 21, 2009. 
65 There were reports in mid-2012 that Facebook had plans to start a job board as well. Joseph Walker, “Facebook to 
Launch Job Board,” Wall Street Journal Online, July 6, 2012, available at 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SBB0001424052702304141204577510933875917766.html. 
66 Compete.com, September 2002. 
 Evans: Attention Rivalry among Online Platforms 
 39 
effects, though, the combination of HotJobs and Yahoo! could have raised questions.  Yahoo! could 
have used the traffic from HotJobs to increase the share of attention it got from users and sold that 
attention to advertisers other than those that look for employers.  Likewise, with a large share of 
attention—especially from passive job seekers—it could have displaced specialized job seekers who 
lacked this different source of traffic. Developing a job-posting feature for its portal could also have 
been a plausible feature for it to develop to compete for attention seekers. While we do not believe, 
based on the analysis presented above, that there should have been serious competitive concerns 
given the intensity of static and dynamic competition among attention seekers, they do point to the 
potential for making false negative errors as a result of focusing on functional distinction and 
defining markets too narrowly.    
  In fact, HotJobs did not prosper with Yahoo!  Its position eroded and Yahoo! started 
looking for buyers.  Monster made an offer again.  This time around one of the key issues before the 
FTC was whether the many job specialized job boards that had emerged competed with the three 
main large jobs that covered many different areas—Monster, Career Builder, and HotJobs.67  This 
question was analogous to the issue one would raise for general advertising vehicles versus 
specialized ones.  Employers—as with advertisers—are ultimately interested in transacting with an 
individual.  Therefore, we would expect that employers would view the attention of people on 
specialty sites (say nursing) to be substitutable for the attention of people looking for jobs (say 
nursing) on a site that serves many different job areas. The large employers—as with advertisers—
also have sophisticated software tools for comparing the value of alternative recruiting methods 
including the various online jobs board. It is easy—as with advertising generally—to move job 
postings between the many alternatives.  In the end, the FTC, without explaining its basis for doing 
to publicly, decided not to attempt to block the acquisition or to impose any conditions on it.  It 
therefore presumably accepted there was a broad market for job postings or, more generally, that 
there were sufficient competitive constraints to prevent employers and job seekers from being 
harmed. 
 
 
C. QIHOO’S EXCLUSIONARY PRACTICES CLAIMS AGAINST TENCENT 
Tencent and Qihoo are Chinese attention rivals.  
Tencent attracts users by providing a variety of free services including instant messaging, 
micro-blogging similar to Twitter, online games, online security, social networking, search and e-
commerce.  QQ, its free instant messaging service, had 399 million monthly active users as of 
February 2012.68 Tencent makes money from selling advertising to companies that want to reach its 
users, from selling virtual products/items for its online gaming services, charging its users for 
 
67 The author worked for HotJobs on this matter and made presentations to the FTC. This section, however, is based 
solely on public information.  
68 iResearch data on number of users per month (February 2012). 
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bundled SMS packages, mobile games, and charging for other mobile value-added services such as 
mobile books and mobile games.69 
Qihoo attracts users by providing a variety of free services including online and mobile 
security such as anti-virus software, a web browser, and a game platform with games developed by 
third-party game developers.70 Qihoo’s Safety Guard, which is an Internet security product, had 366 
million monthly active users in February 2012.71  Qihoo makes money from selling advertising and 
providing web game services. 
Qihoo filed an antitrust case against Tencent in October 2011. It claimed that Tencent had 
abused its dominant position in the instant messaging market as a result of two actions.72 The first 
concerned Tencent bundling anti-virus software with other software. In September 2010, Tencent 
asked IM users that had its “Software Manager”, which did not include anti-virus software, if they 
wanted to upgrade to “PC Manager” which did.  Consumers did not have to upgrade and if they did 
they could run other anti-virus software instead of Tencent’s anti-virus software. The second claim 
concerned alleged exclusionary practices. In November 3, 2010, Tencent required users to stop 
using Qihoo’s anti-virus software it they wanted to continue to use Tencent’s instant messaging 
software. Tencent’s users could still use anti-virus software provided by providers other than Qihoo 
as well as Tencent’s own anti-virus software. The next day, Tencent rescinded that decision 
following complaints from the Chinese government.73 
A threshold question for considering these claims is whether instant messaging is the 
relevant antitrust market and whether Tencent has a dominant position in that market.  One 
approach to this question would involve starting with Tencent’s instant messaging product, 
considering substitutes, and determining the smallest set of products that could be profitably 
monopolized.  That approach is wrong for two reasons.   
First, it ignores the fact that instant messaging is part of a multi-sided platform.  An increase 
in the price, or reduction in the quality of instant messaging, reduces the number of participants in 
the platform. That in turn, through positive feedback effects, reduces the demand by advertisers and 
the revenue received by the platform.  An extensive literature now documents that it is incorrect to 
take a one-sided approach to market definition for multi-sided platforms. 
Second, and the main thesis of this Article, is that it is wrong to focus on the competition 
among specific products offered by attention rivals because that ignores the fact that attention rivals 
are competing for attention by offering different products. This broader competition for attention 
imposes competitive constraints on the ability of any company to raise prices or reduce the quality 
of service. 
 
69 See Tencent 2011 annual report, pp. 107. 
70 See Qihoo’s Prospectus 2011.  
71 iResearch data on number of users per month (February 2012). 
72 Qihoo v. Tencent, The High People’s Court of Guangdong Province, P.R. China. 
73 Multisectoral come forward to "call a timeout" intermission "3Q war" http://epaper.jinghua.cn/html/2010-
11/05/content_600180.htm 
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Both of these points are empirically important for the competition between Tencent and 
Qihoo. They are both multi-sided platforms that connect viewers, advertisers, and developers.  They 
compete with each other and many other Chinese companies for obtaining attention and for 
providing that attention to advertisers.  As Sina, on the large Chinese web companies observes,  
 
The social media and networking sector is highly competitive in 
China. The major portals, including Tencent, Sohu and Netease, offer 
similar products that compete with us for users, traffic, and content 
and marketing resources. In addition, there are many websites that 
specialize in developing social media or social networking services, 
including Renren.com, Kaixin001.com, hainei.com, 51.com and 
159.com.74 
 
Table 8: Major Chinese Attention Seekers, November 2010 
Ranking Platform Type Platform 
Monthly 
Users (Millions) 
Share in 
Major Players 
1 Instant Messaging Tencent QQ 340.13 11.16% 
2 Search Engine Baidu 335.45 11.01% 
3 Integrated Portal Sina Web Portal 275.61 9.05% 
4 Antivirus 360 Security Guards 275.33 9.04% 
5 Integrated Portal Netease 233.38 7.66% 
6 Online Shopping Taobao 220.95 7.25% 
7 Integrated Portal Sohu 212.85 6.99% 
8 Online Video Youku 203.56 6.68% 
9 Online Video Tudou 175.60 5.76% 
10 Search Engine Google 175.21 5.75% 
11 Community Tianya 132.00 4.33% 
12 Site Map Home of Websites 123.09 4.04% 
13 Online Video Ku6 120.09 3.94% 
14 Online Video Thunder Video 118.81 3.90% 
15 Integrated Portal Phoenix 104.89 3.44% 
     
Source: 2010 Internet Usage Statistics iResearchchina.com    
 
 
74 Form 20-F For the Fiscal Year Ending December 31, 2010, Sina Corporation 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1094005/000095012311055179/f59147e20vf.htm 
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To attract attention these platforms offer a variety of products and services some of which 
overlap between platforms and some of which do not.  They provide similar advertising services. 
Table 8 provides a list of the major companies, their key products and services, and their sources of 
revenue. 
The extent to which these platforms compete for obtaining and providing attention is an 
empirical question.  The point of this Article, however, is that one has to consider the sources of 
competition for attention, rather than competition for narrow products and services, to correctly 
address market definition and dominance.      
VII. CONCLUSIONS 
  
People only have so much time.  Businesses that are in the business of enticing people to 
give them a piece of that time push up against that constraint. The amount of content on the web 
has grown far more rapidly than the amount of time that people spend surfing the web. By the end 
of the 2000s the average amount of time that people spend per month using their personal 
computers to surf the web stopped increasing despite many more things to do. Some of that time 
shifted to mobile devices and the web-based and native applications that work with these devices. 
In the digital economy, entrepreneurs are constantly coming up with new and creative ways 
to get people’s attention.  Their companies compete with each other at least in a broad sense.  They 
compete to obtain scarce time and then they are competing to sell that time to advertisers and others 
who would like to have it.  Importantly they are competing even if they are providing very different 
services to people. That’s why Amazon, Facebook, Google, Yahoo!, Yelp and many similar firms 
consider each other rivals even though their primary lines of consumer services are different. 
 Attention rivals impose competitive constraints on each other across boundaries defined by 
products and services they provide to consumers and advertisers.  It is an empirical matter whether 
these constraints are strong enough to place particular attention rivals in the same relevant antitrust 
market and to significantly limit the market power of particular platforms.  That will ultimately 
depend, in part, on the extent to which consumers and advertisers turn from one attention seeker to 
another as prices, quality, and features change.  The standard tools of competition analysis—
diversion analysis and econometric analysis of demand, adjusted for applicability to multi-sided 
platforms—can help analysts obtain the evidence necessary for a proper assessment. 
This Article, however, shows that there is a strong presumption that it is wrong to define 
antitrust markets by looking purely at functional substitution among products.  Moreover, it shows 
that indicators such as churning of firms and the demand elasticity of consumers point toward 
attention rivals generally facing high degrees of competitive constraints that would limit their ability 
to raise price, degrade quality or exclude competitors.  Seeking and providing attention, especially 
online, looks like a rather competitive business. 
 
